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SELECTED ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION'S DOHA ROUND:
OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION
VED P. NANDA*
I.
International trade is credited with alleviating poverty for hundreds of
millions in the world, especially in India and China.1 However, not all have
benefited from it. To illustrate, Africa's share in the world trade has declined since
the 1990s, and sub-Saharan countries have been marginalized. The United Nations
Development Program reported in 2005 that if Africa could have maintained the
share of global export that it had in 1980, its export earnings would have been
about $119 billion higher then. The report noted that "the share of world export of
sub-Saharan Africa, with 689 million people, is less than one half that of Belgium,
with ten million people."3
Multilateral trade negotiations are always complex and never easy to
conclude. The current "Doha Round," formally called the Doha Development
Agenda (DDA), was launched with high expectations in November 2001 in Doha,
Qatar, after the failed Ministerial Meeting in Seattle in 1999. Conceived as a
development round, it was scheduled to be concluded in 2005 and is still awaiting
completion. The Director General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, had earlier
suspended the Doha Round Talks in July 2006 following a meeting of the principal
negotiating countries-the United States, the European Community, Japan,
Austria, Brazil, and India-as no agreement could be reached on agricultural
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1. See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION, ch. 5 (Oxford Univ. Press 2004).
2. U.N. Devel. Prog. [UNDP], Human Development Report 2005: International Cooperation at a
Crossroads-Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal World, 117, UN Doe. HDR2005 (2005) (Kevin
Watkins lead author).
3. Id.
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issues-both subsidies and tariff and quota protections-which remain the most
contentious during this round.
Two years later, Lamy convened a meeting of the world trade minister in
Geneva the week of July 21, 2008, "to bridge gaps in your positions," and in the
belief that "the chances are reaching agreement this month are better than 50
percent.",4 On July 4, in an open memorandum to the trade ministers, he said:
The coming weeks represent the moment of truth for the Doha Round.
If we are to conclude the Doha Round, we must strike a deal this month
on trade in agriculture and industrial goods, provide clear signals on
opening services markets and clear the decks on the remaining issues.5
To the ministers "from our poorest and weakest members," his message was:
"You know this agreement will create new opportunities in the global marketplace
and, coupled with an effective Aid for Trade package, could transform entire
sections of your economy."6 Subsequently, in opening the meeting of the Trade
Negotiations Committee on July 21, 2008, Lamy said that for the action to
conclude the Doha Round by the end of 2008 he could think of "no stronger
spur... than the threats which are facing the world community across several
fronts, including rises in food prices and energy prices and financial market
turbulences." He added, "There is widespread recognition that a balanced outcome
of the Doha Round could in these circumstances could provide a strong push to
stimulate economic growth, providing better prospects for development and
ensuring a stable and more predictable trading system."7
II.
There was a broad consensus in the 1980s that the weakness of the GATT
must be corrected for the functioning of a viable multilateral trading system. The
Uruguay Round negotiations were launched in September 1986, which were
contemplated to last four years, but the Round was eventually signed in April
1994. The outcome was a most comprehensive trade agreement. Its success
included the establishment of a framework of rules and commitments. It further
reduced tariffs, opened up new markets and expanded the GATT reach by bringing
under multilateral trade rules trade related to services, sanitary and phytosanitary
measures, investment, and intellectual property, and by extending some
multilateral disciplines to textile and clothing and agricultural issues. Its crowning
achievement, however, has to be the creation of a new institution, the World Trade
Organization, as the successor to GATT, which indeed heralded the transformation
of the new international trading system.
In his appraisal of the Uruguay Round, the former Director General of
GATT/WTO, Peter Sutherland, observes that developing countries were not
4. Pascal Lamy, The moment of truth, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 4, 2008, at 6 col. 3.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. World Trade Organization, Lamv Says Time for Action is Now Amid Economic Threats, WTO:
2008 NEWS ITEMS, July 21, 2008,
http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news08_e/meetO8_chair_2 ljulyO8_e.htm.
VOL. 36:3/4
OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION
"really left out of the process," while conceding that "the demands the Uruguay
Round made on some developing countries were considerable and sometimes
beyond their means. The need for capacity building and technical assistance was
underestimated and only in recent years has that lack of support been corrected." 8
He acknowledges "the terrible reality that some of the poorest States are denied
access to the trading system because they have neither the necessary human nor
physical infrastructure." 9 The current Director General Lamy concurs:
[W]hile political decolonization took place more than 50 years ago, we
have not yet completed economic decolonization. A fundamental aspect
of the current Round of trade negotiations-the DDA-is to correct
thee remaining imbalances in the trade rules in favor of developing
countries and to improve the rules by providing developing countries
with authentic market opportunities. 
1 0
Notwithstanding these successes, the major criticism of the Uruguay Round is
that overall the developing countries received little benefit from the negotiations.
Although they were granted phase-in periods in many instances for assuming new
obligations, developing countries faced large adjustment costs and lacked the
necessary institutions, physical infrastructure and human resources to take
advantage of these concessions. Also, developed countries failed to fulfill their
promises to provide enhanced market access for developing countries and make
significant reductions in trade-distorting agricultural subsidies.
Ill.
In contrast to the Uruguay Round, the Doha Round has emphasized the
developing countries' needs. The developing countries were actively engaged
through the participation process in producing the Doha Development Agenda,
which indeed was the beginning of a new era, for in all the prior eight WTO
rounds, a small number of the developed countries were involved in the so-called
Green Room negotiations, where they made the major decisions for all members.
The reach of the Agenda, however, was seen by several developing countries as
too extensive and ambitious, as they were concerned about their limited resources
to effectively address the so-called "Singapore issues"-investment, competition
policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation-as well as the inclusion of
electronic commerce; the European Communities had insisted on the inclusion of
these issues. But for the trade facilitation issue, the others were eventually
dropped.
8. Peter D. Sutherland, Leadership and Vision: Some Lessons From the Uruguay Round, in
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE WTO: GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT & DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 49, 50 (Merit E. Janow, Victoria Donaldson & Alan Yanovich eds., 2008) [hereinafter The
WTO].
9. Id. at 59.
10. Pascal Lamy, The WTO Doha Development Agenda: Working For a Fairer Global Trading
System, in The WTO, supra note 8, at 5, 9.
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The Doha Ministerial Declaration of November 14, 2001,11 contains several
elements related to development and alleviation of poverty. Among other benefits,
developing countries would gain from technical assistance and capacity-building
programs and from enhanced market access. The least developed countries
(LDCs), 12 left behind and marginalized in the multilateral trading system, would
be assisted so as to become effective participants.
The Doha Declaration calls for negotiation on outstanding implementation
issues of special concern to developing countries and adopts the Decision on
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns,13 under which members expressed
their determination "to take concrete action" to address implementation concerns
of developing countries, including obstacles to implementation such as resource
constraints. It includes, along with general implementation concerns, those related
to specific agreements, such as the Agreement on Agriculture, the Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the Agreement on Rules of Origin, and
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. The
members also committed to negotiations on agricultural issues aimed at improving
market access and reducing all forms of subsidies, reducing trade-distorting
domestic support, and to negotiations aimed at reducing or eliminating tariff and
non-tariff barriers to non-agricultural products, and negotiation on services.
The Doha Declaration especially addresses three issues of special importance
to developing countries-trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
(TRIPs), technical cooperation and capacity-building, and special and differential
treatment. It also makes special provisions for LDCs.
The Declaration calls upon the Council for TRIPs to study the relationship
between the UN Convention on Biological Diversity and TRIPs, paying special
attention to development.14 It emphasizes that TRIPs should be interpreted and
implemented "in a manner supportive of public health, by promoting both access
to existing medicines and research and development into new medicines."' 15 On
technical cooperation and capacity building, growth and integration, the
Declaration endorses the New Strategy for WTO Technical Cooperation for
Capacity Building, Growth and Integration, and calls upon the Secretariat to
support efforts to bring trade into national development and poverty reduction
plans. 16 It also calls for the WTO to devise a plan for long-term funding of WTO
technical assistance. 17
11. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/l, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
12. LDCs are the world's 50 poorest nations as identified by international organizations.
13. Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, WT/MIN(01)/17, in Doha
Declaration, supra note 11, at para. 12.
14. Id. para. 19.
15. Id. para. 17.
16. Id. para. 38.
17. See generally id. paras. 39-41.
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The Declaration notes the developing country-proposed 2001 Framework
Agreement on Special and Differential Treatment,1 8 which had contended that the
Uruguay Round had resulted in a "dramatic erosion" of Special and Differential
Treatment (S&DT).' 9 The Declaration agrees to review all S&DT provisions
"with a view to strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and
operational," and endorses the work program set out in the Decision on
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns.20 Responding to the concern that
few of the several S&DT provisions in the Uruguay Round Agreements are legally
enforceable, it calls on the Committee on Trade and Development to consider how
to identify mandatory S&DT provisions and how to incorporate them into the
WTO rules.2'
As to the LDCs, while the Doha Declaration expresses commitment to the
goal of duty-free, quota-free market access for LDC exports, it acknowledges the
commitments made by some WTO members to make their markets more
accessible to LDC exports, including such initiatives as the European Union's
"Everything but Arms, 2 the "African Growth and Opportunity Act" of the United
States, 23 and the "LDC Market Access" initiative of Canada. The Declaration also
calls for continued work on LDC accessions to the WTO.24
LDCs may not be able to take full advantage of the preference schemes
mentioned above, in part because of restrictive "rules of origin" and non-tariff
barriers such as stringent sanitary and phytosanitary requirements. These
initiatives are often criticized because there are conditions attached.2 5 In reality,
market access for LDCs often remains illusory, for they lack the infrastructure as
well as the resources for meaningful participation.
Over the years, the developed countries have failed to match the promising
commitments they made in the Doha Declaration. For example, developed
countries' tariff escalation for many agricultural exports of developing countries
18. World Trade Organization, Preparations for the Fourth Session of the Ministerial Conference:
Proposal for a Framework Agreement on Special and Differential Treatment, WT/GC/W/442 (2001).
19. Doha Declaration, supra note 11, para. 7.
20. Id. para. 44, available at
www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/devel-e/dev-special differential-provisions-e.htm.
21. Doha Declaration, supra note 11, para. 12.
22. Under the "Everything but Arms" agreement, the EU gives LDCs complete duty- and quota-
free access to the EU markets. Generalised System of Preferences Council Regulation (EC) No
2501/2001.
23. Under the African Growth and Opportunity Act the U.S. allows duty-free imports from sub-
Saharan Africa when African nations meet certain criteria.
24. Doha Declaration, supra note 11, para. 42. See also Doha Declaration (endorsement of the
Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to Least-Developed Countries), para. 43.
25. See, e.g., Belinda Calaguas, et al., Comment & Debate: No deal on Doha, THE GUARDIAN,
July 18, 2008, at 37 The July meeting in Geneva "will see the EU and the US once again attempt to
pressure developing countries into opening their markets and natural resources to multinational
companies in return for minimal reform of their damaging agricultural policies. Despite the fact that
European politicians and Pascal Lamy are still calling these talks the 'Doha development agenda', real
development dropped off the agenda a long time ago." Id. The writers represent the civil society
groups Action Aid, Friends of the Earth, War on Want, and the World Development Movement.
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remains an acute problem. Also, the developed countries did not provide market
access to the developing countries' products, especially textiles and agricultural
products. Border protection measures in developed countries remained high, with
even higher tariffs for processed products, creating the so-called "tariff escalation
problem." As stated in a 2003 World Bank study, a processed final cocoa product
faced as high as 186 percent tariffs in the United States and 63 percent in the
European Union, while the average tariff on the import of the unprocessed product
is no higher than 0.5 percent in the United States and European Union.2 6Director
General Lamy states that "[i]n Japan, tariffs on coffee escalate from 0% on the raw
product to 24% on the final product. Bound tariffs of the European Union for
unprocessed coffee, tea, mate, and cocoa stand mostly at 0%, while some tariffs
are above 50% for prepared or preserved products. 27 Trade distorting agricultural
subsidies in both the US and the EC are also of great concern to the developing
countries.
The trade negotiations stalled at the following ministerial meeting in Cancun
in 2003.28 Amid recriminations the meeting ended as a dismal failure without
reaching any agreement. A coalition of the developing countries led by Brazil,
China, and India found the US-EU joint proposal on agriculture inadequate and
hence unacceptable because it lacked the needed reform on agricultural subsidies
and tariff escalation. They responded to it with their own agricultural proposal,
and were unwilling to give concession on other issues, including market access on
industrial products and services.29
The talks were resurrected with the July 2004 Framework Agreement reached
at a meeting of the General Council in Geneva.30 The Framework Agreement gave
the LDCs exemption from liberalization commitments in agriculture. It also
allowed developing countries to specify certain products as special, to which they
could apply a special safeguard clause to be negotiated in order to combat import
surges. The WTO members also accepted the principle that deeper cuts should be
made to higher tariffs than lower tariffs.
The next ministerial meeting, held in Hong Kong, was a modest success as it
ratified the decisions made at the Geneva meeting without, however,
accomplishing much more. 31 The members emphasized "the central importance of
26. See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2004 -- REALIZING THE DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS OF THE DOHA AGENDA 2004, at 104 (2003).
27. Lamy, supra note 10, at 9.
28. For the concluding Ministerial Declaration, see World Trade Organization, Doc.
WT/MIN(03)/20, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min03_e/min03_20_e.doc.
29. See generally Ernesto Zedillo, The World Trade Organization's Biggest Problem at Ten:
Surviving the Doha Round, in The WTO, supra note 8, at 63, 67.
30. See Doha Work Programme, Decision Adopted by the General Counsel on 1 August 2004,
WTO Doc. WT/L/579.
31. For the concluding Ministerial Declaration, see Doha Work Programme, Ministerial
Declaration of 18 December 2005, WT/MIN(05)/Dec, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTOe/ministe/min05_e/final-text e.htm [hereinafter Hong Kong
Ministerial Declaration].
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the development dimension in every aspect of the Doha Work Programme and
recommit[ted themselves] to making it a meaningful reality, in terms both of the
results of the negotiations on market access and rule-making and of the specific
development-related issues" they set out in the declaration.32 Of special note is the
agreement to eliminate all forms of export subsidies, reduce trade-distorting
domestic support, and restructure tariff cuts in agriculture negotiations.3 3
Developed countries reaffirmed their commitment to eliminate all forms of export
subsidies on cotton in 2006 and to give duty- and quota-free access for cotton
exports from LDCs "from the commencement of the implementation period. 34
Among LDC Agreement-Specific Proposals related to S&DT, developed
countries are mandated and developing countries are encouraged to provide duty-
free and quota-free market access for all LDC products by 2008 or no later than the
start of the implementation period. Members who faced difficulties in doing so are
to provide such market access for at least 97 percent of LDC products by that time
period.35 Members agreed that
the implementation by LDCs of their obligations or commitments will
require further technical and financial support directly related to the
nature and scope of such obligations or commitments, and direct[ed] the
WTO to coordinate its efforts with donors and relevant agencies to
significantly increase aid for trade-related technical assistance and
capacity building.36
The Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration also had a special emphasis on aid
for trade. This initiative includes technical assistance so as to help countries to
develop their strategies on trade, to negotiate more effectively, and implement
outcomes of negotiating rounds. It also includes infrastructure, that is, building the
roads, ports, and telecommunications linking domestic and global markets;
productive capacity, which means that countries invest in industries and sectors so
that they can diversify exports; and adjustment assistance to help developing
countries with the costs associated with tariff reductions or declining terms of
trade.37 The Declaration calls aid for trade a "valuable complement" to the Doha
Development Agenda," which "should aim to help developing countries,
particularly LDCs, to build the supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure
that they need to assist them to implement and benefit from WTO's Agreements
and more broadly to expand their trade."
38
Members invited the Director General to create a task force to provide
recommendations on how to operationalize aid for trade so that it could contribute
most effectively to the development dimension of the DDA. They also invited the
32. Id. para. 2.
33. Id. paras. 4-10.
34. Id. para. 11.
35. Id. Annex F.
36. Id.
37. See generally World Trade Organization, Development: Aid for Trade -- Aid for Trade fact
sheet, available at http://www.wto.org/englilsh/tratop-e/devel-e/a4te/a4tfactsheete.htm.
38. Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, supra note 31, para. 57.
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Director General to consult with members as well as with relevant international
organizations, the regional development banks, the IMF and the World Bank, with
a view to reporting to the General Council on appropriate mechanisms to secure
additional financial resources for aid for trade, where appropriate through grants
and concessional loans.
The Director General accepted these recommendations. He engaged in a
series of consultations with the pertinent institutions on securing additional
financial resources for aid for trade. He also established a task force as suggested
to advise on how best to deliver this additional funding. The task force's
recommendations 39 included a call for strengthening the "demand side" and the
"donor response," and for closing the gap between "demand" and "response" at the
country, regional, and global level. Another recommendation was for the WTO to
monitor and evaluate aid for trade.
Director General Lamy is a strong proponent of aid for trade in the WTO
agenda. The following two statements clearly indicate the importance he attaches
to this initiative. In his words, aid for trade
has an important political role to play as a complement to the trade
negotiations. Additional development assistance can help [the
developing] countries address trade bottlenecks and unlock their full
trade and growth potential. Aid for Trade is about translating
theoretical trade opportunities for developing countries into realities.
Results on aid for trade are not contingent on the conclusion of the
[Doha] Round, but its value and importance will be greatly increased if
it is implemented in conjunction with substantial new market access
opportunities and new rules on trade facilitation.4
In opening a conference in September 2007 in Lima, Peru, entitled
"Mobilizing Aid for Trade: Focus Latin America and the Caribbean," Lamy
highlighted the role of aid for trade in meeting developing countries' needs. He
said:
Today's global economy-which could be widened and strengthened by
the conclusion of the Doha Round-is fundamentally changing the
development dynamic, creating huge potential for developing countries
to harness trade as an engine of growth. But to seize this opportunity,
they also need access to the basic infrastructure that drives
globalization-21st century transport corridors and telecommunications
networks that can connect exporters to world markets; modem customs
facilities that can move products rapidly and efficiently across borders;
testing labs to ensure that exports meet international standards; financial
"safety nets" to east concerns about economic adjustment and shocks;
39. World Trade Organization, Task Force on Aid for Trade, Recommendations of the Task Force
on Aid for Trade, WTO Doc. WT/AFT/l, 27 July 2006.
40. Lamy, supra note 10, at 11.
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and the sophisticated expertise and institutions needed to navigate a
highly complex world trading system.41
Three regional reviews on Aid for Trade were organized with the help of the
WTO in 2007 in Lima, Peru; Manila, the Philippines; and Dar-es-Salaam,
Tanzania. Subsequently, the first global Aid for Trade review was held in Geneva
in 2007, which featured the participation of a number of trade and development
ministers and heads of regional development banks and the World Bank, IMF, and
the OECD.42
In February 2008, the WTO Director General proposed an Aid-for-Trade
Roadmap, which featured national and sub-regional reviews in Africa, Latin
America and the Caribbean, and Asia and the Pacific. These reviews would be
focused, technical, and results-oriented, with the aim of assisting in
advancing-and then monitoring-the implementation of concrete
national and sub-regional strategies. The broad objective would be to
showcase how Aid-for-Trade strategies can progress-and are
progressing-and to create incentives for others to follow suit.
43
The next global review of aid for trade by the WTO General Council is
scheduled to be held in Geneva in spring/summer 2009, to "provide political
guidance, momentum and the 'big picture' on implementation and evaluation."
The European Union provides a promising example of a region
operationalizing aid for trade. On October 15, 2007, it adopted an Aid-for-Trade
Strategy. 45 The strategy is designed to support all developing countries, especially
LDCs, so that they could better integrate into the world trading system and to use
trade more effectively toward the objective of eradicating poverty in the context of
sustainable development.
In April 2008, an EU Commission staff working paper provided a report as
the first monitoring exercise after the adoption of this strategy.46 According to the
report, 20 of the 27 EU member states "had on-going co-operation activities in the
field of Aid for Trade," and "good progress is being made" toward meeting the
specific EU pledge to provide C2 billion annually to Trade Related Assistance by
2010.47 The report states:
41. World Trade Organization, Aid-for-Trade Initiative "Critical" for Latin America and the
Caribbean Lamy, 13 September 2007, WTO NEWS: SPEECHES,
www.wto.org/english/news.e/sppl-e/sppl68-e.htm.
42. See World Trade Organization, Aid For Trade -- From Making Trade Possible to Making
Trade Happen, www.WTO.org/english/tratop-e/dda e/meet08_briefl0_edoc.
43. World Trade Organization, 2008 Aid-for-Trade Roadmap, Annotated Update, 4 June 2008,
www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/deveLe/a4t-e/a4t/ext/roadmapO8_e.doc.
44. Id.
45. Aid for Trade: EU Council agrees on Strategy, 15 October 2007, http://www.europa-eu-
un.org/articles/en/article 7395_en.htm.
46. Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff working paper, Com (2008)
177 final SEC (2008) 431-435 (April 9, 2008).
47. Id. at 2.
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The EU AfT [Aid for Trade] Strategy is comprehensive: it embraces
"classical" Trade Related Assistance (TRA: Trade Policy and
Regulation; and Trade Development), as well the other areas stressed by
the WTO Aid for Trade Task Force: Productive Capacity Building;
Trade Related Infrastructure; and Trade Related Adjustment. The
double focus on more resources and better impact on development
objectives is complementary. The strategy is closely linked to a
growing international momentum.... 48
This initiative could indeed provide the assistance needed by developing
countries so that they could become active participants in the international trade
arena. The obvious prerequisite for its success, however, is that the existing trade
rules be changed to show sensitivity to what the developing countries need most-
substantial market access to their products in rich countries and a change in the
rules on trade facilitation.
IV.
The week of July 21, 2008, was a period of intense negotiations in Geneva.
The revised draft texts of the July 10, 2008, proposals for agricultural market
access 49 and for non-agricultural market access 5° provided the bases for these
negotiations. Ultimately, on July 29, the talks collapsed. The seven representative
negotiating partners -Australia, Brazil, China, India, Japan, the European Union,
and the US-finally gave up when access to developing countries' markets for
agricultural products from developing countries could not be resolved and Director
General Pascal Lamy's efforts to broker a compromise failed. The demand of
India and China that their farmers be given special protection was a major point of
division, revealing those countries' new and growing impact in the international
trade arena.5' Most observers felt that the Doha Round is not finished, however,
because the compromises already in place could form the basis for further talks.
48. Id.
49. Committee on Agriculture, Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.3 (July
10, 2008) available at www.wto.org/english/tratop e/agric-e/agchairtxt.julyO8_e.pdf The aim of
negotiations is to reform agricultural trade primarily in three areas: market access (tariffs, tariff quotas,
and safeguards), domestic support for farmers and for agriculture, and export subsidies. The modalities
are the way or method of doing something, which in the Doha negotiations means the plans for the
final deal, for example, how to cut tariffs and reduce agricultural subsidies and support, along with
flexibilities to address various sensitivities.
50. Negotiating Group on Market Access, Draft Modalities for Non-Agricultural Market Access
Third Revision, TN/NAIW/103/Rev.2 (July 10, 2008) available at
www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/markacce/namachairtxt..july08-e.pdf. The aim of the negotiation is
elimination or reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers on industrial products, especially products for
export from developing countries. The crucial elements for negotiation include flexibilities for
developing countries to shelter some sensitive sectors from the full impact of tariff reductions and
special treatment for LDCs.
51. See So Near and Yet So Far; World trade, ECONOMIST (London), August 2, 2008; The Next
Step for World Trade, N.Y. TIMES, August 2, 2008.
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V.
This Symposium edition addresses several pertinent issues related to
international trade, including the Doha Round. Professor Kevin C. Kennedy and
John Stencel, past president of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, present their
distinct perspectives on an issue of critical importance to developing countries-
agricultural subsidies and US protection of farmers and agriculture. Professor
Phoenix Cai studies the vast potential of aid for trade and recommends the means
necessary to make this initiative a success. Other issues related to international
trade are those of global warming, discussed by Professor Anita Halvorssen, and
enforcement issues, discussed by W. Davis Jones and Richard W. Emory, Jr., of
the US Environmental Protection Agency. Finally, Professor Wendy Duong
studies the impact of artificial intelligence on the future trends of foreign direct
investment (FDI) in developing countries, especially LDCs.
In his contribution, The Doha Round Negotiations on Agricultural Subsidies,
Professor Kennedy discusses at length the special situation of the west and central
Africa countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Togo, whose exports are
dominated by cotton. Agricultural exports represent over 60 percent of their
earnings and nearly 30 percent of their total export earnings.
After discussing the level of subsidies to their cotton producers by several
countries, including the United States, Kennedy reviews the efforts made in the
WTO negotiations to treat cotton subsidies as a stand-alone issue and outside the
agricultural negotiations, but without any success. He also considers the impact of
the 2004 Brazilian proceedings against the United States through the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism. The Appellate Body ruled in 2005 that US domestic
subsidies to cotton producers had caused serious prejudice to Brazil in world
cotton markets because they had a price-suppressing effect on world prices. He
refers to various studies that demonstrate that US subsidies also affect world cotton
prices.
Professor Kennedy provides a detailed analysis of the efforts made thus far to
reform cotton subsidies and explores the future prospects of similar efforts. As to
domestic subsidies, he considers the best near-term solution to be for subsidizing
nations to fully decouple support-that is, support not tied to production in any
respect-rather than provide price support. And he discusses specific features of
such support-that it has to be the only form of farm support; that the existing
condition for such support that land stay in agriculture should be eliminated; and
that all export subsidies and domestic subsidies in the form of decoupled support
should be progressively phased out. He also recommends internal reforms that
sub-Saharan countries should undertake and suggests that they form a regional
trading bloc.
Professor Kennedy endorses a suggestion made by the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) that phasing out of
agricultural support should coincide with increased international financial and
technical assistance to agriculture in the LDCs aimed at promoting agricultural
productivity growth and commercialization. He finds US agricultural policy to be
unintentionally working at cross purposes with the African Growth and
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Opportunity Act. He surmises that successful Doha Round negotiations could
perhaps achieve meaningful reform of agricultural subsidies. If these negotiations
were to fail, he fears that "litigation may unfortunately replace negotiation as the
default mechanism for forcing reforms."
In Free Trade Versus Fair Trade, John Stencel, past president of Rocky
Mountain Famers Union, warns that liberalized trade will not cure all of
agriculture's ills. He argues instead for "fair trade" as essential to American
agriculture. In his words,
markets fluctuate, currency values change, trade balances shift, and
supply and demand varies. That is the way markets work. That is why
farmers and ranchers need federal farm programs, antitrust protections,
and transparent trade agreements. The nature of the markets, coupled
with the current free market ideology and undue market influence of
international corporations, mean that the present situation in agriculture
is not an aberration but a chronic condition brought to bear upon
farmers by our public policy choices.52
By a fair trade system, he means the one that "protects the economic well-
being, health and environmental concerns, working conditions and labor rights" of
US producers as well as producers from all other countries.
5 3
Stencel contends that bilateral Free Trade Agreements and regional trade
agreements the US has negotiated have damaged the US agricultural economy. He
considers the expanding export market for US agricultural products as failed policy
for, in his opinion, the export problems our policy-makers identify and the free-
trade answers they seek do not address the fundamental problems faced by
American agriculture and do not reflect the realities of global trade either.
Overproduction, he says, is not a key problem, which he considers to be an
oversimplification. Instead, he argues that domestic farm policy and trade
agreements, not farmers' overproduction, create the problem. Stencel suggests the
establishment of a farmer-owned inventory control mechanism for farmers, as
advocated by the Farmers Union. This, he argues, would protect against supply
and demand market fluctuations as part of an income support mechanism to bolster
farm prices for producers. The free trade mentality, he says, is not the answer.
Stencel supports a community-based strategic biofuels program and a US
policy of "managing plenty" of the farm programs with a floor under commodity
prices and effective control of crop mix and acreage and price stabilization to
producers. Just eliminating trade barriers and eliminating subsidies, he argues,
would not result in significantly higher prices for farmers anywhere, as in his view
the high subsidy levels both in the US and Europe are not the cause but the result
of low prices. He believes that in agriculture, and especially in the global
marketplace, giant multinational corporations have the capability to dominate
conditions of trade at the expense of smaller businesses and individuals. Thus,
52. See Stencel, infra p. 366 (emphasis in original).
53. Id. at 349.
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eliminating trade barriers and globalizing markets would encourage these
dominant players to grow even bigger.
Stencel is critical of trade agreements because they could eliminate the
farmers' few protections, such as domestic safety net programs and marketing
agencies, and could result in lowering labor standards and environmental
protections. He recommends new trade rules to combat world hunger and
malnutrition. These new rules should ensure the establishment of an international
food reserve to assure supply when production is hampered by natural disasters.
He also would like to have established a national or international energy reserve of
commodities that could be processed into energy. He concludes: "Agricultural
producers are in a global market that whipsaws food producers into the fruitless
quest to be the lowest cost producers. We need a global market that rewards
farmers for participating in the world's greatest occupation-growing food.",
54
In Aid for Trade: A Roadmap for Success, Professor Phoenix Cai critically
examines in an historical context this new initiative as a complement to the Doha
Round. She first describes the evolution of trade-related aid from the middle of the
20th Century, which was initially characterized by the recipients' having little say
in the decision-making process, as aid was usually driven by political or
commercial considerations of the donors. Thus, recipients had no sense of
ownership or meaningful participation in the trade negotiations. She relates one
success story-that of the Ozone Convention and its Protocols-where the
developing countries assumed ownership and actively participated in the process;
they were provided the needed financial and technological assistance to do so
through the Convention's Multilateral Fund. This she offers as a promising model
framework for a successful aid for trade system.
After sketching the current state of aid for trade, Professor Cai provides a
compelling case for the WTO to use this initiative as a promising opportunity for
the organization to shed its image as a non-transparent organization and instead
enhance its transparency and increase its democratic participation. Aid for trade,
she argues, plays a significant part in facilitating the developing countries'
participation in the multilateral trading system. However, she evidences how
developing nations have been marginalized because of their lack of adequate and
effective market access for their goods and services, coupled with technical
implementation challenges related to agreements on textiles and clothing, anti-
dumping, and TRIPs. She suggests that only at the level of ministerial negotiations
can these issues be addressed and obstacles overcome.
Professor Cai's discussion of the tension between aid and trade is thorough
and insightful. She discusses among other issues the challenge of donor control
and the pivotal role of the recipient government in taking ownership to ensure
development success. She is a strong proponent of developing countries' active
participation in trade negotiations.
54. Id. at 367.
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In her "roadmap for success," Professor Cai provides concrete
recommendations for the main actors-the WTO, developing countries, the trade
legal community-academics, practitioners, and experts -, and donors. These
include bringing Doha to a successful conclusion, providing demand-driven
technical assistance, assisting developing countries in bolstering their participation,
and enhancing transparency and democracy in the multilateral trading system.
Professor Cai recommends that the developing nations should consider aid for
trade as an opportunity to gather the necessary empirical evidence to convince
developed countries that they need to change their policies so that they provide
meaningful benefits to the developing countries. This would require the
developing countries to provide "frank and detailed" assessments to the Task Force
on Aid for Trade, to ensure better coordination among themselves, and to skillfully
use the pertinent information in multilateral trade negotiations.
Professor Cai proposes that the trade legal community play a prominent role
in making aid for trade a success by actively engaging with their aid counterparts
and by providing pro bono legal assistance. As for the donors, she has several
suggestions. In addition to contributing aid funds, they must ensure that the
recipients assume ownership so that aid is country-driven. They should refrain
from attaching damaging conditions to providing aid for trade-they should give it
simply as aid and not "in the guise of complex financial arrangements that may
result in greater debt for developing countries. 55 Also, they should decouple aid
for trade from results in the Doha Round or future trade negotiations.
In her conclusion, Professor Cai sums up the significant role that aid for trade
can play: "The international trading system has much to gain from the effective use
of aid for trade as a tool for fulfilling the promise of the Doha Development
Agenda, alleviating global poverty and giving developing nations a well-deserved
place at the table in the global trade regime. ' 56
In her article, UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the WTO-Brewing
Conflicts or are They Mutually Supportive?, Professor Anita Halvorssen suggests
that the climate change treaties and the WTO regime share the common goal of
promoting human welfare. She examines the relationship between the WTO and
the climate regime-the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and its
Kyoto Protocol-and recommends the necessary changes in this relationship
which would allow the urgent action needed to address climate change can be
taken. Her advice: "Any trade measures inserted into the climate treaties should be
carefully written in order to avoid conflicts with the WTO rules and the WTO rules
need to become more sensitive to the new scenario of trade measures used to
address climate change."57
The changes she recommends include a suggestion that the WTO membership
negotiate and adopt an agreement on climate change and trade, which would
55. See Cai, infra p. 322.
56. Id. at 324.
57. See Halvorssen, infra p. 377 (citation omitted).
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encompass the already-proposed trade in climate friendly technology, not only
covering goods and services but also addressing emissions-trading issues. She
further calls for the establishment of a Committee on Trade and Climate Change to
address areas where trade and climate issues intersect.
In her study of the WTO background, she suggests that the ruling of the
Shrimp-Turtle Case
has opened the door to the possibility of the WTO deciding future cases
in favor of states utilizing measures to address the PPMs, not just the
products' attributes. In the context of climate change, WTO member
states can perhaps claim Art.XX(g) directly when taking measures
against other members' products produced using highly GHG emitting
energy sources. The argument would be that the PPM measures were
used for the protection of an exhaustive natural resource, specifically
the climate system which is being endangered by GHG emissions.
58
Professor Halvorssen offers these proposals after providing a thorough
background on anthropogenic sources of GHG emissions and their relationship to
trade, and reviewing the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, especially the pertinent
trade-related articles and Kyoto's flexible market mechanisms-emission trading,
joint implementation, and the clean development mechanism.
In the first of the two essays on national enforcement, Richard Emory, Jr.,
senior attorney in the international compliance assurance unit of the US
Environmental Protection Agency, offers recommendations for Secretariats and
Conferences of the Parties (COPs) to multinational environmental agreements
(MEAs) so that they can support and strengthen enforcement by governments to
achieve compliance with national laws to implement a Party's MEA obligations.
In his essay, Improving National Enforcement for Better Governance
Implementing MEAs, he describes the essential structural and institutional
measures a Party should undertake so that MEAs are better able to support national
enforcement.
Emory offers a number of recommendations addressing mostly systems,
process, and operations. One is for the Parties to an MEA to form an enforcement
committee. Another is for the MEA secretariat to hire more staff with the relevant
experience as enforcers. Also, one unit of the United Nations Environment
Program should be designated as the coordinating lead agency, perhaps with some
new powers and duties, for enforcement issues affecting all or many MEAs.
Focusing on import/export control, Emory offers "simple and effective"
measures to combat illegal international trade that undercuts MEAs. Each Party
should designate and empower one unit among its MEA Focal Points to be
"National Lead for MEA Enforcement Coordination," and should link its customs
ministry with its environmental (and other MEA focal point) ministries. Among
other recommendations, Parties should move, with the assistance of secretariats, to
develop and, by decisions of the COPs, require product-specific codes so that
58. Id. at 376.
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modem methods including computers can be used. Parties should also adopt
systematic approaches to monitor compliance for imports and exports. For this to
happen, MEA secretariats should design and propose more standardized licensing
schemes and movement documents.
Emory's other "commonsense" approaches for Parties include their
developing an intelligence capability to anticipate illegality and to assess threats.
He cites the example of the Montreal Protocol, as the Parties to that Protocol failed
to anticipate illegality and to assess threats, because they did not foresee that the
Protocol's implementation would bring about black markets and smuggling by
organized and entrepreneurial criminals. Thus, he recommends that each chemical
and its market should be studied for most chemicals covered by the Stockholm
Convention and the Rotterdam Convention. Also, criminal penalties must be
available to maximize deterrence so that prosecutors and judges are able to punish
serious violations.
Emory's final recommendation is that legitimate trade industry, such as trade
associations of importers and exporters, should be engaged as partners by MEAs'
secretariats and parties. He cites the example of the private sector providing key
assistance, including intelligence and sampling equipment, to the US government
in its enforcement of the US Clean Air Act which is required for the
implementation of the Montreal Protocol. MEA secretariats and concerned parties
are asked to exercise more leadership in proposing models and possible standards
to all parties, piloting these measures among willing parties. Successful measures
should become international standards and MEA treaty obligations as prescriptions
by decisions of COPs.
In his essay, The Relationship Between Trade and Effective Enforcement, W.
Davis Jones, International Enforcement Training Coordinator in the US EPA,
discusses the role of the EPA and other government agencies, such as the
Department of State and the Agency for International Development, in helping to
build long-term capacity with trading partners; this capacity is aimed at achieving
effective environmental compliance and enforcement programs. He explains that
because the US is entering into so many bilateral and regional preferential trade
agreements, which include environmental provisions to promote public
participation, there is a need to build the partners' capacity. These agreements also
include measures to enhance environmental performance and to provide
appropriate remedies for violation of environmental laws. He notes that there are
significant enforcement concerns with the various environmental provisions of
these agreements.
Jones gives the example of the provision on public submission process
embodied in the agreement between five countries in Central America, the
Dominican Republic, and the United States (CAFTA/DR), and another provision
outlining an enforcement procedure to follow if the prior clause is violated. Under
this process, the Humane Society International filed such a submission in May
2007 alleging that
by failing to complete a comprehensive inventory of products made
form sea turtles as required by domestic law, the Dominican Republic is
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failing to effectively enforce sea turtle protection laws prohibiting the
sale of products manufactured from endangered sea turtles that were
captured and killed in the country after July 31, 2001."9
The Dominican Republic has been formally requested to submit a response to
the points raised in the submission.
Jones suggests that many US partners in these agreements have gaps in their
compliance programs, and that an effective compliance program must include
compliance incentives and compliance assistance, along with compliance
monitoring. It also must have provisions for sanctions and legal remedies for
violation of the Party's obligations under the law.
Although "effective enforcement" is not clearly defined in such bilateral and
regional agreements, these agreements do include provisions for judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative proceedings to be in place to sanction and remedy
violations. Jones details the full range of activities to be undertaken in an
enforcement cycle. These include setting environmental goals, creating awareness
and understanding of the problem, and planning and implementation of a program
to address the problem's causes. Evaluation of the effectiveness and results, and
recommendations for changes to improve the various components of the cycle, are
essential as well.
Jones warns that the ideal response does not lie with the transplants of US
laws in these countries, for the situations there could be different and most of the
US laws may not work effectively in other contexts and would need to be adapted
for particular situations. He also recommends that the programs must set priorities
and the regulators must develop strategies to effectively monitor compliance,
which could be done in many ways, such as through government inspections,
industrial self-monitoring, or citizen monitoring and reporting.
Finally, Jones suggests that punitive responses to violations, which are
consistently, fairly, and appropriately applied, are essential. Also, there should be
internal and external program evaluation and Environmental Compliance and
Enforcement Indicators could be helpful to assess whether resources have been
utilized appropriately and to assess the kind of benefits resulting to the
environment. He concludes:
It took USEPA over thirty years to evolve into the existing Compliance
and Enforcement program. Through cooperation with trading partners,
the U.S. government can use its experience in environmental control to
share successes and failures and accelerate the program development in
countries worldwide to ensure that everyone effectively enforces their
environmental laws, achieving high levels of environmental
protection. 60
In Effect ofArtificial Intelligence on the Pattern of Foreign Direct Investment
in the Third World. A Possible Reversal of Trend, Professor Wendy Duong
59. See Jones, infra p. 391.
60. Id. at 394.
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expresses her concern that large-scale industrial application of optimum Artificial
Intelligence (AI) in the 21 st Century may halt the flow of foreign direct investment
from the developed countries to the developing countries by changing investor
behavior and eliminating the developing countries' comparative advantages.
Consequently, Al could bring about the return of 19th Century colonialism.
Professor Duong provides a simple definition of AI as the simulation of the
human brain by a computer. She explains:
In AI research, scientific efforts are made to identify those superior
functions of the brain that can be simulated - for example, what an
engineer will do to come up with the system design for factory
production. Then, mathematical models, especially algorithm, are used
to express, memorialize, and document these human brain functions.
The models are then fed into a computer, such that when a standardized
instruction or an inquiry is given, the computer will generate the result
exactly like the work product of the engineer. This enables the computer
software to replace the engineer.6'
She supports her thesis with several studies by UNCTAD, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the World Bank. She
suggests that multinationals from the developed world may substitute AI for many
employees in developing countries, for Al
can literally eliminate the "middle level" of native labor where training and
technology transfer once typically occurred - those mid-level supervisors who
used to handle machineries and make the system run by exercising and
implementing human decisions. Now, Al will be doing their job. The foreign
investor (i.e., the multinational) can now limit knowledge of the At system
design to the "privileged few" in the native population who can receive the
knowledge-base crucial to Al - only those "privileged few" can afford and are
given the opportunity to join the information-based global society. Thus, Al can
tremendously increase the gap between these few ruling elites and the massive
bottom-level workforce, bringing the scenario back to the 19 'h century model of
production, despite the high-tech sophistication of the "digital factory" work
environment.62
She asks, "So, in such a vision, what good does it do for a Third World
country to join the WTO? Free trade will only enable such Third World country to
keep on exporting raw materials and agricultural products to feed the world, a
world ruled by the high-tech producers. 63 And she warns that Al can perpetuate
this imbalance.
Professor Duong calls for systematic and coordinated transnational regulation
in all relevant areas of the law, ranging from global labor laws and policies to
global anti-trust, intellectual property, technology export control, immigration,
61. See Duong, infra p. 327
62. Id. at 329.
63. Id.
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communication, and technology licensing laws and policies. She suggests that
"the only real solution that can effectively protect the global workforce must lie in
a revolutionary framework that can somehow transcend, or even abolish, the
existing sovereign structure in order to achieve universal, transnational
democracy." 64
64. Id. at 334.
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